Ultrascan has extensive experience with identifying, locating, mapping, monitoring, analyzing, and predicting perpetrators of cross-border fraud, money laundering, and the planning, funding, communications, and support of terrorism for local or international religious extremists as a fast-growing component of ideological struggle, as well as geopolitical.
Intelligence professionals that 'task network', determine and eliminate 'valued' targets by integrating OSINT and HACKING with HUMINT and TECHINT into a 'Cloudular Network'.
Not linear but cloudular, which means one asset will lead to others quickly and efficiently as we pull the various threads of information allowing clients to move in many directions at the same time or follow one specific aspect if required.
Five level ultrascans are used for the intelligence-gathering phase of all security-related work and to determine the relationships and real-world links
People, Groups of people (social networks)
Web sites, Internet infrastructure such as Domains, DNS names, Netblocks, IP addresses, Email
Phone, Phrases, Affiliations, Documents, and files
But also hidden or confidential information can be revealed;
Family ties, Health status;
Financial networks, Foreign sales, Financial resources;
Media sources, Disgruntled employees, Imminent threats, Homeland plots, Tradecraft, Recruiting tactics.
A general first wide search for the entities as given by the client, the outcome differs a lot depending on how common the names of entities are.
If the entity is named "john smith" the outcome will be a lot of information containing "john smith" - "john" and "smith"
When the entity is firstname.lastname@example.org the outcome will be information containing or connected to email@example.com
With a combination of entities, for example, firstname.lastname@example.org, XYZ company, London, Cairo, Washington, phone, and green energy, the outcome will be information containing or connected to all entities and links between the entities.
The outcome of the first level scan will value the newly found entities in relation to the given one, depending on the value new entities can be scanned for deeper connections to determine relationships with the originally given entity.
For example, documents with co-signatures, university records, photographs with location and time stamps, logins and passwords of (email) accounts, additional (email) addresses, company websites, Twitter accounts, can link to new entities that have connections with the given entities. Even though some entities are removed from the internet or data set, traces can still lead to new entities (evidence).
Business scan survey's uncovered state sponsored Iranian business networks where fraud shifted from a criminal inspired activity into an ideology driven (terror) funding mechanism, benefiting the the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. Iranian sales companies turned out to be specialized in Advance Fee Fraud “non-delivery scams” and the trading/holding companies in Dubai were nothing less than investment fraud benefiting the IRGC.
Iran says it is defending itself from a US ‘brazen’ plan to change its government. This Western policy is perceived as a death threat, and therefore Iranian hard-liners instructed Iran’s intelligence services to mirror that same policy towards (leaders in) the West. Ballistic missile ranges have been increased as additional visible response.
Having infiltrated the personal ecosystems of government leaders, IRGC is
secretly posing a threat behind the scenes.
Business with Iran was promoted when multinationals from Europe and Asia committed billions to investments in long term strategic industries. Those deals signaled a new page in the history of Iran. In the mainstream media it seemed as if Iran suddenly became an acceptable business risk.
In reality, even after the Iran deal business is risky, because it is a nuclear cooperation deal which includes many circumstantial requirements. What big companies view as an acceptable business risk, still is an unacceptable short term risk.
1. A prior authorisation will be required for business which direct or indirect benefits the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. (IRGC)
2. Financial institutions are still prohibited from supplying SWIFT services until Transition Day in 2023.
When doing business in Iran it’s difficult to avoid the IRGC because the IRGC control a vast number of industriesincluding mining, petrochemicals, telecommunications, health and agriculture. It’s the IRGC that negotiates and grants licenses to operate, process, import and export. Once (smaller) businesses do that, they violate sanctions because that does direct or indirect benefits the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and requires prior authorization.
Businesses, which view Iran as a target economy are frustrated by the absence of banking facilities. Even though Iran agreed to the stipulations that Financial institutions are still prohibited from supplying SWIFT services,Iran says the West is failing to implement its side of the deal by not providing banking and insurance provisions to facilitate trade with Iran. For example, virtually none of the 500 million pound line of credit for Iran by the UK Department for International Trade’s has been used.
Large payments are settled with big price differences in oil shipments. But for operational use inside Iran, multinational companies often use their own financial services, be it branches or representative offices and are able to avoid sanctions liability when dealing with the Iranian government. For example Total has identified small European banks that will furnish its local financing needs in Iran, according to The New York Times, and has spent months sending small amounts of Euro there to test its banking system. Smaller companies (unwittingly!?) use Iranian facilitators in (Dubai) the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Iraq, Azerbaijan and Tadzjikistan.
European and Asian governments recently ordered surveys of Iranian business activity within their borders that revealed organised criminal, Advance Fee Fraud and scam activities of Iranian organisations, companies, and individuals. The survey uncovered state sponsored business networks where fraud shifted from a criminal inspired activity into an ideology driven (terror) funding mechanism, benefiting the IRGC. (e.g. SAVAK, SAVAMA, Ministry of Intelligence of the Islamic Republic of Iran )
Iranian owners lured respected business people as straw men directors for their sales companies in Europe and trading companies in Dubai the UAE. The sales companies turned out to be specialized in Advance Fee Fraud “non-delivery scams” and the trading/holding companies in Dubai were nothing less than investment fraud benefiting the IRGC.
While wealthy Asian, European, American consumers and businesses paid tens of millions in down payments to the sales organisations, (professional and private) investors paid hundreds of millions to holding companies and money laundering vehicles based on forgeries of licences and ownership documents.
Defrauded victims are from Italy, France, Netherlands, Germany, the United
States, Turkey, Oman, China, India, .....
Historically Iran’s Ministry of Intelligence (Savak) has a strong presence in Europe to spy on the Iranian opposition in Iran’s Diaspora. It is involved in spreading misinformation about opponents and recruiting/eliminating opposition members.
Except for the “peaceful” part, it was no surprise to Iran when U.S. Secretary of State Tillerson was repeating a long standing foreign policy (paused under Obama) that the U.S. will “work toward support of those elements inside of Iran that would lead to a peaceful transition of that government." No one should be surprised that this re-activated (U.S.) Western policy is perceived as a death threat and therefore Iranian hard-liners instructed Iran’s intelligence services to mirror that policy towards (leaders in) the West. Including an increase of ballistic missile range to above 2,000 Kilometer.
In addition to organised criminal, fraud and scam activities, the survey of Iranian business activities also revealed infiltration inside the personal eco-systems of internationally renowned business leaders, government ministers and Heads of State. A clear and present danger .
First published by Ultrascan HUMINT
NUCLEAR DYNAMICS In a Multipolar Strategic Ballistic Missile Defense World https://fas.org/wp-content/uploads/media/Nuclear-Dynamics-In-A-Multipolar-Strategic-Ballistic-Missile-Defense-World.pdf
Iran cracks down on Revolutionary Guards business networkhttps://www.ft.com/content/43de1388-9857-11e7-a652-cde3f882dd7b
Iran's Revolutionary Guards reaps economic rewards in Syria https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-iran/irans-revolutionary-guards-reaps-economic-rewards-in-syria-idUSKBN1531TO
Iran Quarry Companies http://www.ples.me/archives/iran-quarry-companies-18636/
Iran Sanctions https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Programs/Pages/iran.aspx
U.S. extends some Iran sanctions relief under nuclear deal https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-usa/u-s-extends-some-iran-sanctions-relief-under-nuclear-deal-idUSKCN1BP22M
Trump Won't Certify Iran Deal, Injecting Uncertainty Into Business and Diplomacy https://www.thestreet.com/story/14342232/1/trump-s-iran-deal-game-change-injects-uncertainty-into-business-and-dip.html
Trump says ‘total termination’ of Iran deal possible http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/trump-says-total-termination-of-iran-deal-possible/article19873398.ece
Trump admin. rolls out new sanctions against Iran https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/may/17/trump-admin-rolls-out-new-sanctions-against-iran/
Anti Money Laundering - Follow the Money - Transnational Organized Crime Nexus Terrorism - HUMINT access to primary sources in and outside every chain of command.